




THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION: 







In this paper I examine the effects of trade liberalization on firms’ performance and 
consumers’ welfare. Using product level data, I study firms’ performance in the Colombian 
automobile industry. Given my disaggregated data I can estimate pre and post-reform price-
cost margins, as well as calculate the results by origin of production. Before the reforms were 
implemented, imported cars had prohibitively high tariffs, on average 200%, and were 
essentially unavailable. After the reforms such tariffs were reduced to 38% on average. I find 
that as the industry restructured prior to the liberalization process, price-cost margins dropped 
from 33% to 24%. After the reforms, margins increased because of the associated lower 
costs, but then again started to fall, reaching a low 23% for domestic cars. The behavior of 
price-cost margins is explained by increasing domestic competition prior to the reforms, the 
associated decrease in costs after the reforms and the relatively unchanged market structure. 
On the consumer side, the approach I follow allows me to estimate the monetary gains due to 
the liberalization process. I find the post-reform gains in consumers’ welfare to be, as a 
consequence of declining prices and increased variety, over three thousand dollars per 
purchaser. A counterfactual simulation, where it is assumed that no foreign cars were 
available after the reforms, suggests that the gains achieved by consumers are due, for the 
most part, to increased variety rather than to price competition.  
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CONSECUENCIAS SOBRE EL BIENESTAR ECONÓMICO COMO 
CONSECUENCIA DE LA LIBERALIZACIÓN COMERCIAL: EL CASO DE LA 






Este artículo estudia los efectos que un proceso de liberalización comercial tiene sobre el 
desempeño de las firmas y sobre el bienestar de los consumidores. Utilizando información a 
nivel de producto, se examina el desempeño de las empresas del sector automotriz 
colombiano. Gracias al tipo de información disponible, es posible estimar los márgenes de 
ganancia antes y después de las reformas comerciales, así como calcular los resultados por 
origen. El arancel para importar carros, antes de las reformas, alcanzaba niveles prohibitivos, 
en promedio 200%, haciendo prácticamente imposible su presencia en el mercado 
Colombiano. Al implementarse las reformas, cuando el arancel cayó a un promedio del 38%, 
se encuentra que los márgenes de ganancia cayeron de niveles alrededor del 33% al 24%. 
Cabe anotar que inmediatamente después de entrar en vigor la reforma comercial los 
márgenes crecieron por los menores costos asociados, para después caer hasta niveles del 
23% para los carros domésticos. El comportamiento de los márgenes de ganancia se explica 
por la mayor competencia interna observada antes de las reformas, por la caída en los 
costos después de las reformas y por la, relativamente estable, estructura del mercado. Por 
el lado del consumidor, la metodología utilizada permite estimar en términos monetarios las 
ganancias fruto de la liberalización comercial. Se encuentra que dichas ganancias son, como 
consecuencia de menores precios y mayor variedad de producto, de alrededor de tres mil 
dólares por consumidor. Mediante ejercicios de simulación, y asumiendo que después de la 
reforma no ingresaron carros importados al país, se encuentra que la mejora en el bienestar 
de los consumidores es fruto de la mayor variedad de producto disponible y no tanto de la 
competencia en precios.  
 
 
Palabras clave:  Liberalización Comercial, Márgenes de Ganancia, Excedente del 
Consumidor, Estimaciones de Demanda, Automóviles, Colombia 
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I. Introduction 
The introduction of theories of trade under imperfect competition challenged the idea 
that gains from tariff removal were always positive. Since then, much of the empirical work 
has focused on determining the possible gains from trade policy (Feenstra, 1995). Previous 
evaluations of trade liberalization have focused primarily on cross-industry regressions. In a 
recent survey, Tybout (2001) concludes that certain protected sectors, when exposed to 
foreign competition, tend to have lower price-cost margins. This result is typically interpreted 
as evidence of an increase in competition.
1 However, the causes remain unclear and the 
effects over the market structure are uncertain.
2  
In this paper, I use different data to study the effects of trade reforms on firms’ 
performance and consumers’ welfare. My objective is to estimate the economic effects of a 
trade liberalization process in the context of an oligopolistic market with differentiated 
products.  I use product-level data from the Colombian automobile industry to estimate 
product-level demand and unobserved marginal costs. By looking at the automobile market in 
Colombia, prior and after the 1990s trade reforms, the effects of such reforms on price-cost 
margins can be evaluated. Moreover, using this approach it is possible to directly take into 
account the effects of foreign competition as well as to estimate (in monetary terms) the 
effects on consumers’ welfare. 
The Colombian case offers an excellent opportunity to study the effects of a 
liberalization process given the way the reforms were implemented. These reforms were 
initially planned in the last quarter of 1990 and scheduled to be gradually implemented over a 
four-year period. However, by the second half of 1991, policy makers did not observe the 
projected effects of the reforms and decided to immediately (and unexpectedly) reduce tariffs 
to the levels expected in 1994. This unique feature, the fact that prior to 1992 no foreign cars 
were available and that the number of domestic firms remained constant over the entire 
sample period, allows me to examine the effects of such liberalization process free of possible 
restrictive endogeneity issues.  
As mentioned above, previous evaluations of trade policy, for the most part, have been 
done using plant or industry-level data. Product-level data has also been used to evaluate the 
                                                 
1 See for example Grether (1996), Harrison (1994), Roberts (1996) or Tybout (1996).  
2 Tybout (2001) points out other possible explanations for such price-cost margins behavior. It might be that 
domestic firms are relatively efficient and thus better able to compete against potential imports or that sunk 
entry costs are so large that low margins (originated from unanticipated foreign competition) prevent firms from 
covering their entry costs.    3
effects of trade policy.
3 With the exception of Brambilla (2003), who estimates the economic 
effects of adopting a customs union between Brazil and Argentina, none of these papers 
study a trade policy reform as the one analyzed in this paper. Moreover, Brambilla’s dataset 
spans only for four years, 1996-99, before the customs union actually took place, a period 
when the tariff for outside vehicles was increasing.
4 The difference between Brambilla (2003) 
and the present study relies not only in the way demand is estimated and in the length of the 
available data, but crucially in that unlike the MERCOSUR case, Colombia faced a one-shot 
(essentially unanticipated) tariff reform. I can therefore estimate observed changes, and 
calculate the effects of certain counterfactual simulations. 
Using prices, characteristics, and sales for cars sold in Colombia between 1986 and 
1998, I adopt a discrete choice random utility model to econometrically estimate demand. A 
GMM framework allows me to deal with the potential correlation between prices and 
unobserved car characteristics and thus to obtain consistent demand estimates. The 
instruments I use exploit increasing competition, the fact that many cars are imported and 
that, even if domestically produced, up to 70% of their components are imported. My first set 
of instruments is based on the idea that for a given car the number and the observed 
characteristics of competing models are correlated with this car’s price, but uncorrelated with 
its unobserved characteristics. As a second set of instruments, I use the real exchange rate, 
the import tariffs, and the sales tax. These variables are correlated with the price, but not with 
the unobserved characteristics.  
Once the demand model is estimated, I compute own- and cross-price elasticities for 
each car in the sample and consumer surplus over the thirteen-year period. The data show 
that as tariffs decline, the number of models sold in Colombia increased, and prices dropped. 
The estimates suggest that the increased variety and lower prices of cars improved 
consumers’ welfare by approximately three thousand dollars per purchaser compared to the 
pre-reform period. Moreover, counterfactual simulations show that most of the consumers’ 
welfare improvements were due to increased variety rather to price competition. Specifically, 
when I compare the consumers’ welfare under the assumption that no foreign cars entered 
the market, relative to the observed consumers’ welfare, the model shows that the sole 
                                                 
3  Examples are Feenstra (1988), Goldberg (1995) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999), who study the effect 
of VER on the 1980’s U.S. – Japan relations. Berry, Grilli and López (1992) study the effects of the NAFTA 
formation on the Mexican car industry.  
4  Vehicles imported from outside Argentina and Brazil.   4
existence of imported vehicles reported gains of more than three thousand dollars per 
purchaser. 
On the supply side, I characterize the behavior of firms as an oligopolistic competition. 
I derive the first order condition under the assumption of existence of a Nash-Bertrand 
equilibrium. With these conditions and the demand parameters estimated following the above 
procedure, I can recover the (unobserved) marginal cost of production for each car model. 
These estimates allow me to calculate price-cost margins as well as changes in firms’ 
performance.  
Theory predicts that lower tariffs and increased competition should reduce these price-
cost margins. Indeed I find evidence of this, but I detect that existing domestic competition 
before the reforms also had an effect on margins. My estimates show that price-cost margins 
declined from an average of 33% in 1986 to 24% in 1991. Despite the fact that only three 
firms existed in Colombia prior to the reforms, anecdotal evidence suggests that in this period 
domestic firms began to compete intensively. Changes in the ownership of such firms and in 
the contractual relationship with the government seem to explain such behavior.  
In the last quarter of 1991, tariffs of the main imported input used in assembling 
domestic cars was reduced from an average of 20% to 3%.
5 Similarly, for imported cars, 
tariffs dropped from an average of 200% to 38%. This decline in tariffs implied a drop in costs, 
and therefore a significant increase in price-cost margins in 1992. Once new firms entered the 
market, this extra competition drove price-cost margins to slightly lower levels than those 
observed before the reforms were implemented.  
With prices going down, to keep margins stable, costs must have fallen. These lower 
costs are a direct result of the lower tariffs and the real appreciation process observed in the 
years that followed the reforms. In 1992, the first year after the reforms were implemented, I 
find the marginal costs for domestic vehicles to be 22% lower than the previous year.  
The reforms pushed both prices and cost downwards. Domestic firms took advantage 
of these reductions in costs while improving efficiency in order to maintain their price-cost 
margins and to compete against imports.  
My results support previous findings that price-cost margins fall as tariffs are removed. 
However, I find that, even in a protected sector, given certain conditions, margins prior to 
liberalization measures are not necessarily high. Moreover, my results suggest that as the 
                                                 
5 This input, known as the “completely knocked down” (CKD) unit, represents about 70% of the cost of 
assembling a domestic car.   5
initial reform shock passes, its effects tend to vanish. Specifically, as competition increased, 
domestic firms lost around 50% of the market. However, their production increased and as 
time passed they recovered much of the market power lost with the initial shock. Lower cost 
pass-through, the small scale of imported cars competition and the remaining protection 
explains the prevalence of the three domestic firms.
 6 
I find, not surprisingly, that domestic firms are less sensitive to external shocks in large 
part because they have are owned by multinational corporations and therefore have a very 
strong link with the respective headquarters. Foreign importers, on the other hand, are 
independent firms with no direct link to their respective international headquarters. This 
explains in part that domestic firms are less dependent to external shocks, such as 
fluctuations in the exchange rate. The effect of this pass-through is found to be incomplete, on 
average 0.50. Notably, the average pass through is higher and more volatile for imported cars 
(0.62) than for domestically produced cars (0.42).  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the existing 
literature. Sections III and IV presents the specifics of Colombia’s trade reforms and its auto 
industry. Section V lays out a model of supply and demand. Section VI describes the data 
while section VII and VIII discuss the estimation strategy. Section IX and X reports and 
discusses the results. Finally section XI runs some specification checks while section XII 
concludes and discusses directions for future research. 
 
II. Empirical Literature on Trade Reforms 
Theory tends to predict that trade liberalization leads to efficiency gains. However, an 
overview of the existing empirical literature suggests that although such gains may actually 
exist, it is not clear that trade reforms are the cause. The literature on the effects of trade on 
growth, productivity and welfare can be divided into three general categories: Cross country 
regressions, cross industry regressions and product level analysis. 
A thorough survey of cross-country regressions is out of the scope of this paper. 
However, it is worth noting that a major issue in this literature is how to measure openness. 
Once the decision is made on whether trade volumes, quotas (or tariffs), price differentials or 
artificially constructed indices (such as the Sachs-Warner index) are to be used, the main 
                                                 
6 Tariffs for imported cars remained relatively high, 38%, while tariffs for the inputs used in assembling a 
domestic car (CKD) were set to be only 3%. Further, in 1996 the sales tax for domestic cars, under 1.4 liters, 
was set to be 20%, while for an imported car this tax was 35%.   6
result in most papers is that trade reforms seem to have an effect on growth (and 
productivity), but results are not robust, and no strong policy conclusions can be extracted 
from such literature.
7  
Cross industry regressions use primarily manufacturing industry data, whenever 
possible disaggregated at the plant level. Tybout and Westbrook (1996) claim that industry or 
plant level data is preferred because country level data cannot be used to distinguish scale 
economies from changes in market share allocation across heterogeneous plants, or from 
technological progress.  
  Despite the volume of empirical work that addresses the correlation between trade and 
firms performance, efforts to measure gains from trade at the micro level have been 
inconclusive. For example, Harrison’s (1994) results suggests, analyzing the 1985 trade 
reforms in Cote d’Ivoire, that price-cost margins fall only in few sectors. However, the period 
of analysis for her paper is 1979-1987 not enough to actually test for long term effects of the 
reforms. Harrison has access to tariffs data and finds that productivity increased after 
liberalization took place, but sector-by-sector, the net results are inconclusive.  
Haddad, de Melo and Horton’s (1996) and Tybout’s (1996) results for Morocco and 
Chile respectively raise doubts on whether exposure to international trade affects market 
power when using import penetration as trade proxy.
8 Haddad et al. (1996) show that entering 
firms consistently locate in exporting sectors but find no clear pattern of correlation between 
trade flows and price-cost margins.  
Roberts (1996) studies the Colombian manufacturing industry over the period 1977-85, 
during which no major trade reform took place. He finds no statistical significant effect 
between import penetration and price-cost margins in Colombia. However, he does find some 
effect over relatively more concentrated industries. For the late 1980s Mexican reforms, 
Grether (1996) results suggest that foreign competition reduced price-cost margins. Having 
access only to industry level data Foroutan (1996) analyzes the early 1980’s Turkish trade 
reforms. He finds that, depending on the specification used, import penetration varies from 
little impact to none. He argues that the little impact of reforms may be due to the fact that 
export oriented industries were already the most competitive and efficient firms. 
                                                 
7  See for example Renelt and Levine (1992), Harrison (1996), Frankel and Romer (1999) or Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2000). 
8  Haddad, de Melo and Horton (1996) study the 1983-84 trade reforms in Morocco. Tybout (1996) studies the 
1979 trade reforms in Chile with 1979-1985 plant level data. As Grether (1996), Haddad, de Melo and Horton 
(1996) and Roberts (1996) do for several other countries, Tybout analysis is performed using industry and 
plant level data. In general, results are very week when using industry level data.   7
  Recent work by Pavcnik (2002) and Muendler (2002) based on the Olley and Pakes 
(1996) methodology, use Chilean and Brazilian plant level data respectively to analyze the 
evolution of productivity in those countries manufacturing sectors.
9 Pavcnik finds no evidence 
that firms in export competing sectors increase performance, but her results suggest that, for 
import competing sectors, liberalized trade did in fact enhanced plant productivity. Muendler 
concludes that foreign competition improved productivity while eliminating inefficient firms. 
  The above review, though far from exhaustive, suggests that the effect of trade 
liberalization still remains an empirical question. As argued by Tybout (2001), it seems that 
there is a tendency for mark-ups to fall with import competition, but the link between trade 
reforms and the observed performance is not yet clear.  
   The third category of trade liberalization related literature; product level analysis is 
also the most recent. This approach has been widely used in the industrial organization 
literature in the past.
10 The use of such models for trade related questions is much more 
scarce. Among the latter, Berry, Grilli and López (1992) forecast the expected growth of the 
Mexican car industry in an attempt to anticipate the effects of NAFTA. They conclude that 
economic growth together with declines in price to world levels would expand the Mexican 
auto market. 
The imposition of voluntary export restraints (VER) from Japan to the U.S. was the 
focus of Goldberg (1995) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1999). The former finds that the 
VER were binding in the first years after they were imposed, while the latter finds the 
opposite. Brambilla (2003) measures the effect of adopting a customs union in the automobile 
market in Argentina and Brazil. She finds that under a customs union, prices in Argentina will 
be lower, while consumers were better off. The opposite is true for Brazil. 
 
III. Trade Reforms in Colombia 
Following international trends, many Latin American countries undertook international 
policy changes in the early 1980s. However, not until the early 1990s did Colombia decide to 
engage in such changes. For years, Colombia was an inward-looking economy, and 
remained such even until the late 1980s. Though some very timid liberalization measures 
                                                 
9  Pavcnik focuses her research on the period 1976-86. Muendler uses Brazilian plant level data for the period 
1986-98. 
10 See Feenstra (1988), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), Goldberg (1995), Nevo (2001) or Petrin (2002)   8
where taken in the early 1980s, it was not until 1991when deep structural fiscal, labor, 
monetary and trade reforms were actually implemented.
11  
The outgoing government took initial steps around 1989, but different internal and 
external events prevented any serious reform from being implemented. Therefore, it was not 
until 1990, when the recently elected Gaviria Administration designed a four-year program to 
gradually lower tariffs. However, in October 1991 the gradual program was terminated and 
Colombian policy makers decided to abruptly lower tariffs, breaking the program designed 
months earlier.
12 Tariffs were set, in the last quarter of 1991 to the 1994 expected levels. 
Among other reasons, the stagnation of both imports and exports induced government 
analysts to believe that economic agents where postponing any investment decision until the 
moment when tariffs were at their lowest levels. 
 
IV. The Colombian Car Market 
Over the period 1986-1998, three companies were the sole assemblers (not 
producers) of cars in Colombia. The three companies are Compañía Colombiana Automotriz 
(CCA), assembler of Mazda; Sociedad de Fabricación de Automotores S.A. (Sofasa), 
assembler of Renault and General Motors Colmotores S.A. (GM Colmotores), assembler of 
General Motor vehicles.
 13  
The oldest firm is Colmotores, which was founded in 1956. Chrysler owned the 
company until 1979, when General Motors bought the production plant. In 1991 the name 
was changed to its current name. As part of GM, the company assembles and sells in 
Colombia Chevrolet’s, Opel’s and Suzuki’s models under the Chevrolet make. Historically, 
Colmotores has been the largest of all three firms. 
CCA, the second oldest firm, was founded in 1960. In 1973, Fiat and the government 
Industrial Investment Institute (IFI) bought the company. Fiat models were produced until 
1983 when the company was authorized to switch and produce Mazda’s instead. In 1988 IFI 
sold its share to Colombian private investors who in turn sold its part to Japanese investors. 
By 1993, the entire company was owned by Mazda. 
                                                 
11 See Garay et. al 1998. 
12 The program aimed to lower tariffs from an aggregate average level of around 25% in 1990, to a level of 11% 
in 1994.  
13 Originally and up to 1991 it was known as Fabrica Colombiana de Automotores S.A. As a GM partner, 
Colmotores sells Chevrolet, Suzuki and Opel among others.   9
Sofasa was established in the late 1960’s by the creation of a joint society between IFI 
and Renault. In 1989 Renault bought IFI’s share and offered 24% to Toyota Motor 
Corporation. Colombian private investors bought 52% of the company in 1994, remaining the 
rest at equal shares in the hands of Renault and Toyota. Finally, in 2003 the Colombian 
investors sold its share of the company to Renault, Toyota and Mitsui.
14 
   Given that domestic firms assemble but do not produce cars in Colombia, most of its 
inputs are imported. The imported materials known as CKD, which stands for Completely 
Knocked Down, represent around 70% of a fully assembled car.  
  Throughout the period of analysis (1986-1998), the main regulation changes were 
related to the 1991 structural reforms. Prior to the reforms, the government intervention in the 
car market began to be relaxed, particularly in the second half of the 1980’s. In 1988 a new 
contract unifying the operational conditions of all three firms in the market was signed. Each 
firm was authorized to assemble no less than three models per year. They had to produce 
each model for at least 5 years and provide spare parts for at least 10 years. A 3% tax on the 
value of CKD imports in order to support the auto-parts sector was also established. Prior to 
this new contract competition was distorted as each firm had a different contract with the 
government giving artificial advantage to the firms depending on the contract conditions. Up 
to 1985 prices of taxis, commercial vehicles and small cars were regulated. This type of 
regulation was terminated early 1986.  
In 1991 the government authorized the entry of new firms willing to assemble, it 
eliminated the import license requirements for CKD units and reduced the tariffs for both CKD 
and imported or completely built up (CBU) cars. Firms were allowed to freely assemble as 
many models and versions as they wanted, as long as they guaranteed the supply of auto 
parts and service for each model for a period of at least 10 years. Other legal changes had to 
do with the domestic components requirements for Colombian produced or assembled cars. 
Despite these changes, no new company has yet established a plant in Colombia.  
 
V. The Model 
As mentioned above, the estimates of the demand model using product-level data are 
later combined with a supply model in order to determine the effects of the Colombian trade 
liberalization process. The use of disaggregated data offers several advantages. First, I 
                                                 
14 Today Renault owes 60% of the company, Toyota 28% and Mitsui 12%.   10
observe physical output as opposed to the revenue observed when using industry (or plant) 
level data. Second, competition is not inferred, but directly observed as imported cars flood 
into the market. Third, the approach is flexible enough to allow the researcher to actually 
measure (in monetary terms) the effects of such trade policy, and finally, it is possible, via 
simulations, to infer the effects of foreign competition on consumers’ welfare. The obvious 
drawback is that I am only looking at one particular market. It is common, however, for trade 
agreements to give a different treatment to certain sectors, particularly the auto sector. For 
example, the free trade agreement signed in the mid 1990s between Colombian, Mexico and 
Venezuela treated differently this sector. While cars tariff were not initially included in the 
agreement, they expected fall to 0% in 2007.   
 
V.i. Demand Model 
  I will use a discrete choice random utility model to estimate the demand parameters. 
The demand model described below is derived from McFadden’s (1978) generalized extreme 
value model as developed by Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg (1997).  
The product differentiation general extreme value (PD GEV) model allocates each 
alternative to one nest along each of pre-selected dimensions, which characterize attributes 
of the product. It is based on the notion that markets for differentiated products exhibit 
increased cross-elasticity due to nesting relative to dimensions. In this paper I differentiate 
cars along two dimensions: origin (domestic vs. foreign) and size as perceived by engine 
displacement (small, medium, large). 
The most commonly used version of GEV models is the nested logit. Motivated by 
different questions, Goldberg (1995) and Goldberg and Verboven (2001) use a multi-level and 
a two-level nested logit respectively to estimate demand for cars.
15 Similarly, also for cars, 
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995, 1999), Petrin (2002) and Brambilla (2003) use a random 
coefficient logit approach to determine demand estimates.  
The main advantage of the PD GEV model over the nested logit model is that while in 
the latter the order of the nests matters, in the former it does not. The nested logit model 
implies that all alternatives are grouped into pre-determined mutually exclusive nests. This 
means that given two categories, origin and size, a change in price on say, a small Colombian 
                                                 
15 Goldberg and Verboven also attempts to estimate their model using a PD GEV, but they report that this model 
did not find support in their data.   11
car, will have the same effect on shares on a medium Colombian car, than over a large 
Colombian car. The PD GEV overcomes this limitation. 
In principle, the random coefficient logit model allows for flexible substitution patterns 
without a priori segmenting the market. As argued by Nevo (2000), this advantage comes at a 
cost. First, as shown below, the expression for the share function is solved via simulation as 
opposed to the close form of the PD GEV model. Second, detailed information about 
consumer heterogeneity is required to compute the market shares. More important, Petrin 
(2002) notes that a very rich dataset set is required in order to obtain precise estimates. 
Given the limitations of my dataset, only 926 observations and no consumer heterogeneity 
available beyond income, I choose to use the PD GEV model.  
Assume that the conditional indirect utility function for consumer i for product j in 
market (period) t depends on observed product characteristics (xjt), unobserved (to the 
researcher) product characteristics (ξjt), income (yit), price (pjt), and unknown parameters θjt. 
Building on a Cobb Douglas utility function, Berry et al. (1995) showed that the following 
functional form may be used to study the consumers’ decision problem: 
(1)      
T t J j I i
x
x p y U
jt jt jt
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where εijt is defined below. The δjt term is common to all consumers and is therefore referred 
to as the mean utility, α is the marginal utility from income and β represents specific taste 
characteristics.  
  Correlation between the price and the unobserved product characteristics is expected 
because when the price is set, the producer takes into account these (observed by the firm) 
characteristics. When estimating the model, this endogeneity issue will be taken in 
consideration. 
 Consumer  i will buy car j if he/she reports a higher utility, i.e.: 
  ) ; , , , ( ) ; , , , ( θ ε ξ θ ε ξ irt rt rt rt ijt jt jt jt p x U p x U ≥ , for r=1…J 
  The model must take into account the possibility that consumers may not want to buy a 
new car. Ignoring this possibility would imply that an even change in the price of all cars will 
have no effect over demand and so, the substitution patterns would be biased. Let Ajt be the 
set of values for ε such that the consumer decides to buy good j. 
} ,... 1 , 0 ), ; , , , ( ) ; , , , ( : { J r for p x U p x U A it rt rt rt it jt jt jt jt = ≥ = θ ε ξ θ ε ξ ε    12
The mean utility from the outside option cannot be identified separately from a constant 
term in equation (1) and therefore is normalized to zero as is common in the literature, i.e. 
0 ) ln( ≡ + + = iot ot it iot y u ε ξ α  
  Assuming ties occur with zero probability, and given P0(ε),  the density of ε  in the 
population, the market share of the j
th good as a function of the J+1 goods competing in the 
market is: 
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where x.t=(x1t,…,xJt). Similarly for p and ξ. 
 Dropping  the  t subscript, and defining M to be the size of the market, the J-vector of 
demands is Msj(p,x,ξ;θ). 
The integral in (2) can be computed either analytically or numerically depending on the 
distribution assumption made for εij. If εij is assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) across choices, if its believed multivariate extreme value and if no additional 
heterogeneity (beyond the εij term) is assumed, then the integral can be solved analytically. 
Specifically, letting Vij=αln(yi-pj)+δj and making use of McFadden (1978) the share function 
can be derived. This paper specifies that if F(εio,… εiJ) denotes the J+1 dimensional CDF of ε, 
and G(y0,…, yJ) is a nonnegative, homogeneous of degree one function satisfying certain 
restrictions,
16 then 
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is the multivariate extreme value distribution, and 
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defines the market share equation of product j, where Gj is the partial derivative of G with 
respect to e
Vij.  
  I therefore define G(.) to be the weighted sum of two one-level nested multinomial logit 
G(.) functions, as follows: 
                                                 
16 Specifically G(.) has to be non-negative, homogenous of degree r, (where r≥0), lim. G(.)→∞ as e
Vj→∞, for 
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where O denotes origin (domestic (d) or foreign (f)) and S stands for size (small (s), medium 
(m) or large (l)). Under the conditions stated above, the model is consistent with random utility 
maximization for all possible values of the explanatory variables as long as ρO and ρS lie in the 
unit interval.
17  
 Letting  O(j) and S(j) denote the groups to which product j belongs, and using G(.) from 
equation (3), the following share equation is derived: 
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  Equation (4) is the probability that consumer i buys car j and is composed of two terms, 
one for origin and one for size. It implies that for any product j, a change in the price or 
characteristics of any other product located in the same cluster will have a stronger impact on 
product j than on any other product located in a different cluster.  
The parameter ρ is a measure of the degree of independence in unobserved utility 
among the products in nest n. That is, as ρ tends to zero, the dependence across products 
that share a particular nest become stronger. Conversely, if ρs=1, the model reduces to a 
nested logit by origin status only. Similarly if ρo=1, the model reduces to a nested logit by size 
status only.  
Notice that equation (4) is the close form solution to the integral presented in equation 
(2) and the corresponding substitution patterns derived from this share function are: 
                                                 
17 Train (2002) explains that for ρ>1 the model is still consistent with utility maximizing behavior for some range 







































































































where n denotes either origin or size, sn stands for the share of nest n and sj/n is the share of 
car j if nest n is selected. If j=k and a car does not share a nest with any other car (not the 
case in my dataset) or if (both) parameters ρ equals one then the own elasticity reduces to 
the multinomial logit result αpj(1-sj)/(yi- pj) For the cross elasticity, the terms of the summation 
reduce to zero for any nest which does not include both cars j and k.  
Given equation (5) it is straightforward to verify that for any two models j and k sharing nests 
–for example say we have a domestic (d) medium (m) sized car- then: 
() ( ) ( ) () dm dl dm ds dm fm dm fl dm fs dm dl dm ds dm fm dm dm and , , , , , , , , , , , , , η η η η η η η η η
>
<
≥ ≥  
where 
2 1,n n η is the average cross-price elasticity of a car in nest n2 with respect to a change in 
price of a car in nest n1. That is, the two principles of differentiation (origin and size) are 
treated in a completely symmetric way.  
Finally, the expression for sij has to be aggregated up to the product market share 
function. While aggregating I take advantage of income and population data available for 
Colombia. I define ten equally size deciles and compute the per capita income of consumers 
within each income class. I then calculate equation (4) for the average consumer in each 
income class and sum up to generate the aggregate market share. However, for Colombia 
not all income classes can afford a car. Recall the definition of Vij above and note that ln(yij-pj) 
is only defined for positive numbers. I therefore only take into account values where the ln(yij-
pj) is defined.   
 
V.ii. The Supply Side 
The supply model derived in this section will be used to generate an equilibrium 
condition which allows me to calculate the (unobserved) marginal costs, markups and price-
cost margins for all cars in my sample. Elaborating on the model, I also estimate the effects 
on prices of an external shock on the marginal cost for each model in my dataset.    15
Assume that in any given year t, there are F firms, each of which produce some subset 
Jf, of the j=1…J different makes of cars.  The firms profit function is given by 
∑ − − =
f J
) ( ) ( f j j j f C p Ms mc p π  
where mcj is the marginal cost, Cj is the fix cost of production and M is the total market size.
18  
Under a pure Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, the resulting prices must satisfy the following 
first order condition, 
0
) (
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where  j r p p s δ δ ) ( comes from the demand model. 




















  In vector notation the above first order conditions becomes 
(6)       0 ) ( ) ( = − Ω − mc p p s  
Noting that s(.), p and mc are Jx1 vectors, the markup can be estimated by solving for  mc p −  
(7)       ) ( ) (
1 p s mc p
− Ω = −  
  Therefore, solving for mc in (7) the estimated marginal cost mc
e, is 
(8)       [ ] ) (
1 p S p mc
e − Ω − =  
where mc
* is a Jx1 vector.  Now, using equation (8) I can calculate the price-cost margins for 
each car j,  j
e
j j p mc p ) ( − . 
  The model derived allows for different counterfactual experiments. In particular, for 
reasons discussed later on, I am interested in the effects on prices of changes in the marginal 
cost. Assume therefore, that each model’s marginal cost remains unchanged, except for an 
external shock, for example a variation in the exchange rate. Once the marginal cost 
                                                 
18 The market size is assumed to be the number of households that, given their income, could at least buy the 
cheapest car each year. This is approximately 80% of Colombian total households.   16
changes, firms will adjust price and will solve equation (6) for a new equilibrium price. Let 
o
j mc  
be the estimated marginal cost defined as: 
firm foreign j if mc mc
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where I am using the fact that domestic cars import 70% of their components. For domestic 
cars, 
f
j τ  stands for completely build up (CBU) or imported car tariff, while 
d
j τ  corresponds to 
the tariff of the main input used in the assembly process or the completely knock down (CKD) 
unit. The imported components marginal cost, 
o
I mc , where o stands for origin either domestic 
(d) or foreign (f), is measured in domestic currency. Note that for a foreign car, this is just the 
value of the imported vehicle, while for the domestic auto it’s the value of the CKD unit.   
I can derive the effects on prices of changes in marginal costs by totally differentiating 
for any given j equation (6) with respect to all prices and the marginal cost. Doing so gives:  
dmc dp
n Γ = Λ  
where dp
n is a Jx1 vector with each element equal to ) , , 1 ( , J k dp
n
k L =  and n stands for the new 
equilibrium price. Similarly, dmc is a Jx1 vector with each element equal to  ) , , 1 ( , J k dmck L = . 
Λ is a JxJ matrix with each j
th row and k
th column defined as follows 
()
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Finally, Γ is a JxJ matrix with each j
th row and k







, if j and k are produced 
by the same firm, 0 otherwise. Inverting Λ gives: 







Equation (9) says that the change in the price of car j due to changes in its marginal 
cost, depends not only on changes in the marginal cost of other cars produced by the same 
firm, but also on own and cross price derivatives as well as in changes on the demand curve.  
   17
VI. Data Description and Some Initial Results 
My dataset contains information of prices and characteristics per model sold in 
Colombia between 1986 and 1998. Indicator variables for whether the car has air conditioning 
(AC), power windows, power mirrors, power seats, alloy wheels, power door locks, assisted 
steering wheel and radio as standard equipment were obtained from Motor magazine.
19 Other 
product characteristics, obtained from each models brochure going back to 1986, include the 
car dimensions (length, width and height), weight, engine displacement, horsepower and 
number of doors. Absent from a significant number of models are characteristics such as 
kilometers per gallon, maximum speed, acceleration and number of valves. 
The price variable is the list price as shown in several issues of the Colombian Motor 
auto magazine. All prices are deflated by the consumer price index and are in 1996 
Colombian pesos, though most of the results, for ease of comparison, are presented in 1996 
United States dollars. The sales variable corresponds to sales in Colombia. 
The estimations presented below use only the available data on automobiles, by far, 
the most common type of vehicle sold in Colombia. Prior to 1992, SUV’s and pickups sales 
represented on average less than 20% of the market. After the reforms were implemented, 
automobiles sales were never lower than 70% of the total.
20  
As a principle of differentiation, rather than using the cars dimensions (as used for 
example by Goldberg, 1995), I choose engine displacement as measured by cubic 
centimeters (CC). My choice is based on the fact that automobiles are legally classified in 
Colombia according to CC, among other things, for insurance purposes. Additionally, 
consumers perceive many models differently, despite sharing the same chassis and body, 
because they are equipped with different engines. Such vehicles have the same dimension, 
they look alike, but they actually belong to a different segment.  
During my sample period, six hundred thousand cars were sold. I was able to match 
price, quantity and characteristics to most of the cars in my dataset. However, I was unable to 
identify 24,406 cars because they show up as others  in the quantity dataset. I treat a 
model/year as an observation, which gives me a sample size of 936 models. Additionally, I 
was unable to obtain the price for ten observations, and so my final sample size is composed 
                                                 
19 Specifically I used the website www.motor.com.co, Internet version of the specialized auto magazine Motor. 
20 Though sales information for both SUV’s and pickups was available, unfortunately characteristics data was 
not.   18
of 926 models. Throughout the paper I assumed that two models are the same in two 
subsequent years if they have the same name and the dimensions have not changed. 
In addition, I had access to tariffs information as well as the value added tax and the 
real exchange rate.
21 The tariffs variable is disaggregated in two. On one hand I have 
compiled the tariffs for completely built up (CBU) imports, that is, fully assembled, ready-to-
sell vehicles. On the other, I also have data on tariffs for the main inputs used in the assemble 
process, the completely knock down or CKD units. Such distinction is important as I observe 
the origin of each model. Therefore, the relevant tariffs for a domestically produced car is the 
CKD tariff, while for the imported car, the CBU tariff is the appropriate one.  
Tables I, II and III provide some summary statistics. Table I presents information on the 
main characteristics including price. These include horsepower over weight (HP/W), 
dimension, AC, power windows, power door locks, radio, engine displacement and alloy 
wheels. HP/W, measured as horsepower per kilogram, proxies for fuel efficiency as well as 
for power; it is expected to affect positively the utility of a consumer. Dimension is defined as 
length times width. The effect is not clear, though one tends to believe that on average 
individuals prefer bigger cars. Finally, engine displacement is measured in liters and the 
indicator variables (1 if standard equipment, 0 if not) show how, on average, characteristics 
have changed over time.  
  A first overview of the data clearly illustrates the structural changes observed in the 
market once the reforms took place. Both table and figure 1 show significant changes 
between the pre-reform (1986-1991) and the post-reform period (1992-1998). On average, 22 
models were offered between 1986 and 1991. By 1992, 71 different car models were offered, 
peaking 142 in 1997. Table II however, shows that the number of domestic models offered did 
not change much over the sample period.  
The data also shows that prices in Colombia, in the 1980’s, were abnormally high for 
international standards. In 1986 the mean price of a car was, in 1996 U.S. dollars, almost 
$23,000 while the average price for a car in the United States at the time was around 
$18,000.
22 By 1992, average prices in Colombia were over nineteen thousand dollars, 
approximately a thousand dollars higher than in the US. By the end of my sample period, on 
                                                 
21 Tariffs data is provided by the National Planning Department, value added by the Ministry of Finance and the 
real exchange index by the Colombian Central Bank, Banco de la República 
22 The average US price is from the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National 
Income and Product Accounts.   19
average a car could be bought in the US paying just over nineteen thousand dollars. In 
Colombia, that year, the average price of a car was under fifteen thousand dollars.
23  
  Between 1992 and 1994, immediately after the trade reforms were implemented, car 
sales radically increased. The annual average growth rate of car sales in that period was over 
50%, significantly higher than the 10% average growth rate observed in my sample period. As 
imports increased, the market share of domestic firms dropped. On average, importers gained 
in seven years over 40% of the car market in Colombia. 
  A closer look at the data shows that the number of domestic cars expanded with the 
reforms, but only for a short period of time (Figure 1). Sales of domestically produced cars 
increased from an average of less than 30 thousand cars per year prior to the reforms to a 
peak of forty three thousand in 1994. Sales of domestically assembled cars have steadily 
gone down since then. For example in 1998 only 28,670 domestically assembled cars were 
sold, less than in 1986. 
  To further explore my data, and to check the direct effects of trade liberalization on 
prices, I ran a simple regression of prices against tariffs and competition controlling for car 
quality. Results are shown in table IV. The regressors include vehicle attributes, tariffs, a 
competition proxy and time dummies. All included vehicle characteristics contribute positively 
to the log of price in a precise way. As expected, large cars tend to be more expensive than 
smaller cars.  
For reasons explained above, tariff in table IV is defined to be the CKD tariff if the car 
is domestically produced and the CBU tariff if the car is imported. The estimated coefficient is 
statistically significant and has the correct sign. That is, as tariffs drop, prices fall. In both 
regressions I used a variable called competition to proxy for the increased number of vehicles 
sold in the market, and therefore to proxy for the increased competition due to the 
liberalization process. Competition is defined as the number of models within the same 
segment that compete with car j. The results show that prices drop as more models enter the 
market.   
 
VII. Estimation of the model 
The predicted market share derived in equation (4), analytically obtained by solving the 
integral in equation (2), is a function of observed and unobserved product characteristics, as 
                                                 
23 To get some perspective, note that in 1992, the US GDP per capita was 21,800 dollars while Colombia’s was 
1,300. The numbers for 1999 are 31,500 and 6,600 respectively.    20
well as prices. A straightforward strategy to estimate the model is to choose parameters that 
minimize the distance between the predicted and the observed market shares: 




.) are the predicted market shares and S the observed market shares. However, the 
expected correlation between prices and the unobserved characteristics as well as other 
computational issues led Berry (1994) to develop a technique that deals with these 
complications.
24  
 Berry  (1994)  defines  ξ as a structural error term, rather than as the difference between 
the observed and predicted market shares as is done in equation (10).  
  As shown in equation (1), the mean utility δj(
.), is linear in ξ j. Consequently, given the 
predicted and observed market shares I want to solve for δ the following system of J+1 
equations:
25 
(11)       . ) ; ( S s = θ δ  
Equation (11) cannot be solved analytically due to the presence of three non-linear 
parameters, α, ρo and ρs. Therefore using a non-linear numerical procedure I solve for δ as a 
function of the observed market share and the non-linear parameters.  
Define Z=[z1,…,zM] to be a set of instruments such that 
(12)      [ ] , ... 1 , 0 ) (
* M m Z E m = = ⋅ θ ω  
where ω, a function of the true parameters θ
*, is an error term defined as, 
ξ β δ ω ≡ − = X (.)  
The moment condition given in equation (12) can be used to define the following generalized 
method of moment estimator (GMM): 
(13)       ) ( ' )' ( min
1
, , θ ω θ ω
ρ β α Z ZA L
− =  
where A is a consistent estimate of E[Z’ωω’Z]. 
As is, the GMM estimator involves a potentially large set of parameters to estimate. 
However, noting that the β parameters enter linearly, the minimization in (13) can be 
performed only with respect to the non-linear parameters α and the ρ’s. I therefore estimate 
the β’s as follow: 
                                                 
24 Particularly when dealing with models where non-linearity’s arise.  
25 Recall that we are normalizing the outside good to zero.   21
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− − − =  
and then substitute this expression into the objective function (13).  
 
VIII. Instruments 
  As argued earlier, a higher unobserved product quality, ξ should lead firms to set 
higher prices. Moreover, due to the firms’ first order conditions; ξ will also be correlated with 
the prices and market shares of the other products.  
Therefore, the estimation of equation (13) requires instrumental variables that satisfy 
equation (12). Ideally I would use (model-level) cost data as instruments. However, beyond 
the average cost of assembling a car for each of the three domestic firms I had no further 
access to direct cost data. This would be a valid, though insufficient, instrument if I were to 
estimate demand exclusively prior to 1992 when only domestic producers sold cars in 
Colombia. 
  Fortunately, some cost related data is available. Given that (after 1991) imported cars 
represent a significant share of total sales and that the main inputs of domestically produced 
cars are also imported I use both a real exchange rate index and import tariffs as instruments. 
  The advantage of using exchange rates and tariffs is that they are clearly exogenous to 
the car industry and that they both exhibit significant variation over time and across car 
segments. The obvious drawback of using exchange rate and tariffs as instruments is that 
neither of them is model specific, at most, specific to a certain range of cars. Therefore, they 
are helpful, but not sufficient for identification. The sales tax, which I also use as an 
instrument has the same advantages and disadvantages of the aforementioned. 
  A second set of instruments is based on Bresnahan’s (1981,87) assumption that the 
observed characteristics xjt are exogenous (or predetermined). Berry et al. (1995) built on this 
idea to generate instruments based on the assumption that E(ξ/X)=0. In particular, for each 
product characteristic x (excluding price), they use as instruments the (1) own characteristics 
and (2) the sum of characteristic x of all cars produced by the same firm f in the same year, 
and the sum of characteristic x of all cars produced in the same year by other firms. These set 
of instruments assume that the observed characteristics are uncorrelated with the unobserved 
characteristics, thus satisfying equation (12). Bresnahan, Stern and Trajtenberg (1997) follow 
a similar approach, but exploit their assumption about the group structure of product 
differentiation.   22
Therefore, based on the idea of the exogeneity of observed product characteristics and 
of the number of models available in the market per period, I build a second set of 
instruments. These are the average value of the characteristics by cluster (origin and size) 
and by shared cluster. I also use the total number of cars sold by cluster. The latter are 
competition based instruments in that they assume that the number of cars available in the 
market each year is correlated with prices but not with unobserved characteristics. 
  In summary, the instruments that I use are, the cost based set, the BLP type by cluster 
and the competition based instruments. Table I of the appendix supports the validity of the 
instruments used as the first stage F-test of the instruments is 20.66, significant at the 1% 
level. Further, a Hausman test of overidentifying restrictions returns a value 19.99, not 




The main results from my benchmark specification are summarized in Table V. They 
differ significantly from the logit and IV logit results presented in Table II of the appendix. In 
particular, the estimates of the logit models are imprecisely estimated while the results for the 
IV logit improve significantly. The sign of most characteristics are the expected but for the 
most part are not statistically significant. However, the coefficient for the marginal utility of 
income α, increases when moving from the OLS logit to the IV logit specification.  
The results of the PD GEV model shown in Table V are promising. The coefficients are 
precisely estimated and appear to be reasonable from an economic point of view. The results 
suggest that individuals prefer bigger cars as well as high horse power relative to weight. The 
coefficient on power windows remains negative, as in the logit and IV logit models, the only 
counterintuitive result. Finally, the marginal utility of income has the correct sign and it is 
statistically different from zero and both ρo and ρs lie in the unit interval as required to be 
consistent with utility maximization. The estimated coefficients of these parameters suggests 
that there is indeed a significant degree of market segmentation along both origin and size 
dimensions.  
The positive and statistically significant coefficient for the domestic dummy implies an 
outward shift of the demand curve if a car is Colombian made. The observed home bias 
means, given ρo  less than one, that a car will enjoy certain degree of protection against 
                                                 
26 The critical value at the five percent significance level and with 16 degrees of freedom is 26.30   23
foreign competition if it is domestically produced. Similar arguments imply that small cars 
seem to enjoy stronger preferences relative to medium and large cars. 
Once accurate demand estimates are available, I apply equation (5) to calculate own 
and cross price elasticities. Table VI reports own price elasticities by origin and size. On 
average demand elasticities are higher for domestic cars, though over time this pattern tends 
to change. Similarly, medium sized cars tend to have higher elasticities than small and large 
cars.  
Table VII reports cross price elasticities averages by origin and size. The estimate of ρo 
suggests that consumers tend to view products of the same origin –either domestic or foreign- 
as closer substitutes than products of different origin. Indeed table VII (partially) confirms this. 
As the price of a domestic automobile goes up, individuals are more likely to substitute 
towards domestic rather than switching to foreign cars. On the contrary, as change in the 
price of a foreign vehicle has a stronger effect on domestic than on foreign cars, suggesting 
once more a strong home bias in Colombia.  
Similarly, the estimate of ρs implies that consumers tend to substitute towards cars of 
the same size. Table VII confirms this finding, as substitution towards other size vehicles is 
very low, mostly concentrated in medium sized vehicles. 
Tables VIII, IX and X report a sample of own and cross price elasticities for several 
cars in three different years, 1987, well before the reforms, 1992, beginning of the reforms 
and 1996, when such reforms are expected to be consolidated. Several points can be 
extracted from these tables. First, as expected, luxurious cars have very inelastic demands, 
while middle priced cars tend to be more price sensitive, possibly induced by a stronger 
competition in the medium sized segment (see table II, column vii). Second, cross elasticity 
patterns seem to be consistent with the idea that similar cars tend to be closer substitutes for 
one another. For example, in 1992 a 1% increase in the price of a small Chevrolet Sprint will 
have no effect over a Mercedes, but it will have considerable effect over a less expensive 
Mazda 323 HS or Renault 9 Brio. And third, these tables strongly suggest that the functional 
form is not driving the results. More precisely, opposite to simple logit or IV logit models, 
prices do not drive own price elasticities as explained in Nevo (2000).   24
X. Effects of the Reforms 
Once I have accurate measures of elasticities, I make use of equation (7) to calculate 
the price-cost margin for each vehicle. Theory (and intuition) suggests that as competition 
increases, margins should fall.  
First, lets look at the estimated markups (p-mc). Table XI reports the average markups 
by origin and size. As expected, markups did fall, but only until 1994. Beyond that, markups 
remained relatively stable. By origin, foreign cars clearly have higher markups, though over 
time some convergence is observed between imported and domestic cars. By size, results 
are the expected, that is, large cars have higher markups, while smaller cars have lower 
markups.
27  
The (sales weighted) average price-cost margins (PCM), defined as (p-mc)/p*100, are 
reported in Table XII. Figure 2 plots these results by origin. The first pattern that emerges 
from the graph is that PCM are declining even before the reforms took place. Such pattern, 
prior to 1992, a period where only domestic firms were present in the market may seem 
surprising. This behavior is explained by the observed fall in prices, which in turn was caused 
by a combination of events.  
The most important episode prior to the reforms was the government decision to 
deregulate the market. Under this policy, the government sold its share of domestic firms to 
foreign private investors. Mazda’s headquarters in Japan bought CCA (Mazda producers in 
Colombia) and Renault and Toyota bought Sofasa. Second, led by GM, the operating contract 
signed between each of the three domestic firms and the government was unified. Price 
regulation was terminated, and all three firms began to operate in Colombia under the same 
conditions. Third, Sofasa introduced a new model, the Renault 21, that turn out to have 
assembling defects. This forced the company, not only to inspect all models sold previously, 
but also to lower the price of all Renault 21’s sold afterwards. It was a combination of these 
factors that induced a stronger competitive behavior in the automobile market even before the 
reforms took place. Therefore, as prices declined, with costs relatively unchanged, price-cost 
margins dropped. 
  Costs dropped drastically in 1992 due to the trade reforms. CKD tariffs declined by 
almost 20%, CBU tariffs dropped from 75% to 38%, non-tariff barriers such as import license 
                                                 
27 Note that for large cars the post-reform markup increased relative to the pre-reform period. The introduction of 
more luxurious cars (such as BMW’s, Mercedes’, inexistent prior to 1992) explains this behavior.    25
requirements were eliminated and further a real appreciation process began to take place. All 
this combined implied a significant drop in costs and consequently an increase in PCM.  
  Many of the imported cars in 1992 were large expensive cars, hence autos with high 
margins. As competition increased, margins began to fall. By 1994 domestic car margins 
reached a historic low. At that point, PCM for foreign vehicles stabilized, but domestic PCM 
began to increase. Three reasons explain this behavior. First, though domestic firms did not 
prepare in anticipation for foreign competition, they did so when competition arrived. Sofasa 
and GM, for example, installed modern equipment to improve the painting process. These 
improvements entered the assembly line between 1995 and 1996. Similarly, on these lines, 
all three firms reorganized the assembly plant and developed new technical training centers. 
Second, in 1996 the government implemented a differential sales tax. If a car under 1.4 liters 
was assembled domestically the sales tax was set to 20%, if it was imported the 
corresponding sales tax was set to be 35%. This 15% difference together with the already 
existing 30% difference on average between the CKD tariff (recall, 70% of a domestic car) 
and the CBU tariff gave domestic cars extra advantages. Finally, the real appreciation 
process ended and devaluation began to increase at the end of my sample period.  
Given the behavior of the PCM, it seems interesting to check the sensitivity of domestic 
firms and foreign importers to external shocks on the marginal cost. Using the supply model 
developed earlier I calculate the effect on prices of an external shock on the marginal cost of 
each vehicle, such as a change in the exchange rate. Figure 3 shows the pass through effect 
to be stronger on foreign cars relative to domestic cars. It is also evident from the graph that 
the effect is much more volatile on importer than on domestic firms.  
Such pattern is due in part to the fact that domestic cars have only 70% of its 
components imported. Moreover, domestic firms import relatively larger amounts of CKD units 
as different models use the same unit in the assembly process. Importantly, evidence 
collected while visiting Colombian firms suggest that domestic firms’ imports are less 
dependent on external shocks as they are much more linked to their headquarters.
28 Foreign 
car importers, on the contrary, rarely have any direct link with the headquarters world 
guidelines, and in occasions have had trouble importing the amount required of cars because 
Colombia is not a priority market for these firms. Thus, they are much more exposed to 
possible external shocks fluctuation. 
                                                 
28 Of course, these external shocks must remain at certain levels. Colombia nominal devaluation in the 1990’s 
never was larger than the 25% reached in 1998.    26
With prices falling, particularly in the second half of the nineties, given the observed 
behavior of PCM, then in must be that costs dropped even more. Table XIII presents 
evidence of that. No direct cost data was available beyond the average cost of domestic parts 
bought in Colombia for use in the assembly process. Column 1 of table XIII shows that on 
average these costs were almost half in the nineties than in the eighties. Specifically, these 
costs were on average 4.4 thousand dollars before 1992. By 1998 this number was less than 
2.5 thousand dollars.
29 
The remaining columns of table XIII show the marginal cost calculated from the model 
estimated above. Between 1986 and 1991 marginal costs remained relatively stable around 
16 thousand dollars on average. During the nineties these marginal costs dropped steadily 
reaching around 9.5 thousand dollars in 1998. By origin, despite the observed convergence in 
costs, domestic cars still present lower costs than foreign cars. 
It is worth noting that comparatively, Colombian average price-cost margins are similar 
to those reported by Goldberg and Verboven (2001) for European cars and Berry et al (1999) 
for US autos. Goldberg and Verboven report price-cost margins of around 20% with peaks in 
Italy of about 40%. Berry et al. margins vary from about 20% for cheap cars to around 40% 
for expensive luxurious vehicles. Brambilla’s (2003) PCM for Brazil and Argentina are higher 
than those I find. She only reports the average result over time and over models. For 
Argentina, her estimates for own elasticities are similar to mine, but her PCM are around 
50%, much higher than those I find. In Brazil, with very inelastic own elasticities, the PCM is 
around 60%.
30 
Finally, as prices decline, consumer welfare as measured by consumer surplus is 
expected to increase. The results, presented in Table XIV, show that consumer welfare 
behaved as expected. Consumer surplus increased, particularly in 1993 and 1994 
immediately after the reforms took place. The average change in consumer welfare, when 
comparing the average consumer surplus of the pre-reform period with the post-reform period 
was of about three million pesos, around 3,271 1996 dollars. This is the observed increase in 
welfare due to the trade reforms.  
To grasp a complete view of the effects of the reforms, I ask what the consumers’ 
welfare would have been in the absence of imported vehicles. In order to implement this 
                                                 
29 In 1996 dollars. 
30 The mean own price elasticity for all models in Brazil is –1.7.   27
counterfactual scenario I remove all foreign cars from the available choice set, re-compute the 
market shares of domestic cars only and then re-estimate consumer surplus.  
Given the unavailability of foreign vehicles before the reforms the counterfactual 
exercise is only relevant for 1992 onwards. Moreover, as ρO is set to one in equation (3), the 
demand model discussed earlier reduces to a one level nested logit, where consumers can 
only choose according to the vehicles size. Initially lets assume that prices and characteristics 
remain unchanged when the choice set is reduced to domestic cars only. Under this scenario, 
the first column of Table XV presents the difference between the observed consumer welfare 
and the (new) estimated welfare under the counterfactual assumptions. In the first year of the 
reforms, the gains in consumer welfare are small as few foreign models were available and 
because expensive luxurious cars accounted for a large part of the imported vehicles. The 
gains per purchaser quickly peaked in 1993 when they reached $4,298 dollars and on 
average, the gains per consumer due to the availability of imported cars in the Colombian 
market were of $3,000.
31  
Lets now relax the assumption that prices of domestic cars remained unchanged in the 
absence of imported vehicles
32. To do so, I need to re-compute the new equilibrium price 
using equation (7) assuming that only domestic cars were available in the Colombian market. 
The estimated (average) increase in the price of domestic vehicles is estimated to be just 
below 4%. The second column of Table XV reports welfare gains per purchaser using this 
new set of prices. As prices are higher, the estimated consumers surplus per purchaser 
decreases, and therefore the welfare gains of introducing imported vehicles in the market are 
slightly greater than those estimated with fix price. The average (estimated) increase in 
consumer welfare per purchaser is $3,276. When comparing this figure with the $3,000 found 
when assuming fix prices, one concludes that most of the welfare gains for consumers came 
from variety, not from price changes. 
 
XI. Specifications Checks 
Table XVI checks how robust the model is to the characteristics chosen for the main 
specification, model 1. Model 2 runs the regression without the Air Conditioning dummy giving 
                                                 
31 To avoid confusion recall that earlier I found the increase in consumer welfare to be $3,271 per purchaser, 
when comparing the pre and post reform period. The $3,000 figure should be taken as the increase in 
consumers’ welfare due to a variety increase (from foreign vehicles) in the Colombia market. 
32 I will however keep the assumption that characteristics of domestic cars are the same independent of the 
availability of foreign cars. Given the trend of characteristics observed in table I it doesn’t seem such a strong 
assumption.   28
its non-significance in Model 1. Results are maintained both in terms of point estimates and 
statistically significance.   
Model 3 runs the same regression as model 1, but excluding dimension. As one of my 
principles of differentiation I chose engine displacement as a measure of size. In principle, it 
may be of concern to include dimension, as measured by length times width, with size 
dummies. The results from excluding dimension in model 3 suggest that my results in model 1 
are valid since my estimates do not change significantly.  
 
XII. Conclusion 
In this paper I have examined the changes in price-cost margins before and after major 
trade reforms took place in the Colombian auto industry. I made use of a discrete choice 
random utility model to determine the factors that influence demand for cars as economic 
reforms took place. The demand estimates allows me to calculate own and cross price 
elasticities, which I plug into a supply model to estimate price-cost margins without observing 
marginal costs. Finally, I calculate consumer surplus as a measure of consumer welfare.  
The results suggest that trade liberalization had important effects over the car industry. 
As tariffs dropped, previously unavailable foreign cars were introduced into the market, 
domestic firms improved the quality of their product and were forced to reduce price due to 
competition. A combination of these factors implied that consumer welfare increased by 
almost three thousand dollars on average per consumer.  Moreover, the results suggest that 
most of the welfare gains were due to increased variety, rather than to decrease in prices.  
I find that before the reforms were implemented price-cost margins were falling. As the 
industry restructured in the second half of the eighties, the three domestic firms newly 
intensified competition drove prices down. Given relatively unchanged costs, price cost 
margins began to fall. Despite the ongoing liberalization process that was taking place in 
other countries during the 1980s, anecdotal evidence suggests that Colombian firms did not 
prepare in advance for the expected lower tariffs. It was only after the reforms were 
implemented that domestic firms began to worry about improving their production process. 
The results indicate that price-cost margins behavior differed when considering 
domestic and foreign firms. Initially, regardless of origin, price-cost margins dropped for all 
cars as a consequence of the liberalization process. However, by 1995, margins of imported 
vehicles stabilized at around 35%. Domestic vehicles’ price-cost margins, on the contrary,   29
began to increase, reaching, by the end of the sample period, about the same level to that 
observed in the first year, around 34%.  
The main explanation for such performance is that costs kept on falling despite the fact 
that tariffs did not. Indeed, some indirect effects of the trade liberalization process made 
domestic firms to actually increase price-cost margins. The increased competition forced 
domestic firms to improve efficiency in their plants. However, even after the liberalization 
measures were implemented, tariffs remained relatively high for imported cars, while the 
relevant tariff for domestic cars was much lower. Also, in the mid nineties, the government 
implanted a differential sales tax between domestic and imported cars, which served as 
another form of protection. Moreover, importers of foreign cars are for the most part small 
domestic firms importing cars with no strong link with the multinational headquarters, while 
domestic firms depend directly on the headquarters. This structure makes imported cars 
much more dependent on external shocks.   
Overall, the liberalization reforms had the expected effect, but they seem to be still half 
way through. As of today, it is scheduled that in 2007 tariffs be reduced to 0% for imported 
cars from Mexico and Venezuela. Currently Colombia is negotiating the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas and simultaneously seeking to reach a bilateral agreement with the U.S. The 
effects of such future reforms remain to be explored but are without doubt of interest, not only 
for Colombia, but also for other developing countries that face similar situations.   
This suggests future extensions based on the model and the results found of the 
paper. As part of a policy debate, it is important to disentangle the effects of trade reforms on 
specific markets. As globalization increases, small-scale markets, such as the Colombian 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics  
Means (Sales Weighted) 
(Standard Deviation in Parenthesis) 
   No. of  Price
1 HP/W
2 Engine  Dimension
4 AC
5 Power  Power  Door  Radio
5 Alloy 
   Models        Displacement
3         Windows
5 Locks
5    
Wheels
5 
1986  18 22,988  0.078  1.516  6.836  0.091 0.152  0.093 0.107  0.034
      (6,571)  (0.013)  (0.337)  (0.874)  (0.296) (0.369)  (0.299)  (0.318) (0.185)
1987  23 25,082  0.079  1.508  6.831  0.177 0.243  0.267 0.268  0.132
      (7',967)  (0.011)  (0.377)  (0.910)  (0.389) (0.438)  (0.452)  (0.452) (0.345)
1988  19 23,522  0.078  1.459  6.652  0.275 0.416  0.242 0.224  0.137
      (8,073)  (0.013)  (0.382)  (0.989)  (0.458) (0.506)  (0.440)  (0.428) (0.353)
1989  21 21,111  0.078  1.462  6.675  0.281 0.406  0.205 0.326  0.122
      (6,801)  (0.013)  (0.365)  (0.976)  (0.460) (0.503)  (0.413)  (0.480) (0.334)
1990  27 20,815  0.079  1.473  6.718  0.212 0.390  0.319 0.354  0.150
      (6,756)  (0.012)  (0.358)  (0.911)  (0.416) (0.496)  (0.474)  (0.487) (0.363)
1991  26 18,434  0.080  1.464  6.663  0.195 0.298  0.272 0.329  0.134
      (6,349)  (0.009)  (0.333)  (0.880)  (0.404) (0.466)  (0.453)  (0.479) (0.347)
1992  71 19,415  0.082  1.508  6.889  0.289 0.325  0.238 0.360  0.363
      (10,185)  (0.013)  (0.345)  (0.722)  (0.456) (0.471)  (0.429)  (0.483) (0.484)
1993  82 19,922  0.083  1.509  6.941  0.294 0.406  0.282 0.433  0.333
      (9,778)  (0.014)  (0.353)  (0.723)  (0.458) (0.494)  (0.453)  (0.498) (0.474)
1994  122 18,679 0.082  1.447  6.823  0.308  0.367  0.282  0.447  0.401
      (7,876)  (0.0129)  (0.317)  (0.719)  (0.463) (0.483)  (0.452)  (0.499) (0.492)
1995  127 17,986 0.081  1.425  6.736  0.276  0.348  0.287  0.401  0.492
      (7,730)  (0.013)  (0.295)  (0.671)  (0.449) (0.478)  (0.454)  (0.492) (0.501)
1996  133 16,533 0.081  1.386  6.601  0.299  0.265  0.230  0.403  0.466
      (7,083)  (0.0123)  (0.262)  (0.664)  (0.460) (0.442)  (0.422)  (0.492) (0.500)
1997  142 15,897 0.083  1.386  6.591  0.188  0.240  0.237  0.472  0.427
      (6,379)  (0.012)  (0.239)  (0.674)  (0.392) (0.428)  (0.426)  (0.501) (0.496)
1998  115 14,444 0.086  1.418  6.653  0.328  0.274  0.227  0.547  0.463
      (6,341)  (0.012)  (0.246)  (0.709)  (0.471) (0.448)  (0.421)  (0.500) (0.501)
1986-98  926 18,862 0.082  1.448  6.735  0.259  0.318  0.249  0.390  0.335
      (8131)  (0.013)  (0.314)  (0.771)  (0.438) (0.465)  (0.433)  (0.488) (0.472)
1986-91  22 22,300  0.079  1.480  6.729  0.205 0.317  0.233 0.268  0.118
1992-98  113 17,437 0.083  1.440  6.748  0.283  0.318  0.255  0.437  0.421
1 Price in 1996 dollars                  
2 HP/W:  measured in Horse Power (HP) per Weight (in kilograms)            
3 Engine Displacement measured in Cubic Liters              
4 Dimension is width*length. Square meters              
5 Indicator Variables, 1 if it has the characteristic as standard equipment, 0 otherwise        





   (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)  (vii)  (viii)  (ix) 
   Price






Rate  Number of Models Offered  Market Share
5  Number of Cars Sold 
      Tariffs
2 Tariffs
3     Tax   Index  Domestic Foreign Small Medium Large Domestic Small Medium Large  Total Domestic Foreign 
1986  22,988  19.94  200.00  19.94  26.55  113.96 18  - 5 8 5  100.00  31.28 46.47  22.25  29,150 29,150  - 
1987  25,082 20.66  200.00  20.66  26.86  114.77  23  -  6 10 7  100.00  43.62 30.11  26.27  34,277 34,277  - 
1988  23,522  19.52  200.00  19.52  25.95  113.78 19  - 6 6 7  100.00  47.54 27.04  25.42  36,775 36,775  - 
1989  21,111  20.24  218.00  20.24  26.88  120.60 21  - 6 8 7  100.00  47.68 30.07  22.25  30,471 30,471  - 
1990  20,815 20.53  116.00  20.53  27.35  130.99  27  -  7 11 9  100.00  48.47 28.79  22.74  25,786 25,786  - 
1991  18,434 19.45  75.00  19.45  26.45  114.75  26  -  7 11 8  100.00  45.14 34.04  20.82  22,206 22,206  - 
1992  19,415  3.00  38.83  13.20 28.50  108.71  27  44  13  28  30  71.53 44.36 36.09 19.55  34,230 24,485  9,745 
1993  19,922  3.00  38.12  18.38 28.80  110.29  23  59  14  36  32  56.22 42.60 39.89 17.51  62,324 35,037  27,287 
1994  18,679  3.00  35.00  15.92 27.16  102.87  25  97  21  63  38  59.62 52.66 35.10 12.24  72,452 43,199  29,253 
1995  17,986 3.00  35.00  14.96  26.48  104.46  28  99  26  67  34  62.64  56.67 35.00  8.33  66,191 41,462  24,729 
1996  16,533 3.00  35.00  14.21  26.28  100.00  36  97  30  71  32  64.97  64.98 30.82  4.21  61,442 39,921  21,521 
1997  15,897 3.00  34.64  18.12  27.12  92.77  32  110  37  81  24  52.01  53.62 44.04  2.34  74,687 38,999  35,688 
1998  14,444 3.00  34.83  19.53  27.81  100.99  25  90  29  74  12  48.07  39.01 57.27  3.73  59,643 28,670  30,973 
1986-91  22,300  20.06  168.17  20.06  26.67  118.14 22  - 6 9 7  100.00  43.96 32.75  23.29  29,778 29,778  - 
1992-98  17,437 3.00  35.92  16.33  27.45  102.87  28  85  24  60  29  59.29  50.56 39.74  9.70  61,567 35,968  25,599 
1986-98  24.74  10.87  96.96  18.05 27.09  109.92  25  85  16  36  19  78.08 47.51 36.52 15.97  46,895 33,111  25,599 
1 Price in 1996 US dollar                                              
2 Tariffs for the CKD units used by domestic producers (%)                            
3 Tariff for imported cars (%)                                 
4 Tariffs used in regression. It uses CKD tariffs for domestically produced cars and assembled car tariffs 
for foreign cars (%)               
5 As defined by total sales                                                 
Source: See text.      
 
 Table III 
Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean    Std  Dev  Min  Max 
Sales Tax  32.41  7.33  20  45 
Real Exchange Rate Index  109.21  23.78  8.75  187.89 
Tariffs
1 26.82  13.48  3  40 
CKD Tariffs
2 11.05  10.86  3  30 
Assembled Car Tariffs
3 58.69  54.27  31.5  218 
1 If Domestic Car, CKD tariffs. If Imported Car CBU Tariffs    
2 Tariffs for main components of domestically assembled cars (the CKD unit) 
3 Tariffs for imported cars (CBU)        







Dependant Variable Log(price) 
Log(Dimension)  1.431 0.777 
   (0.103)*** (0.105)***
Log(HP/weight)  0.599 0.325 
   (0.061)*** (0.065)***
AC  0.109 0.116 
   (0.019)*** (0.018)***
Power Windows  0.088 0.073 
   (0.023)*** (0.023)***
Log(Engine    0.939 
Displacement)   (0.090)***
Small  -0.296    
   (0.040)***    
Medium  -0.149    
   (0.0338)***   
Competition
  -0.152 -0.113 
   (0.0538)*** (0.091)***
Tariffs  0.017 0.012 
   (0.006)*** (0.012)***
Constant  2.471 2.438 
   (0.273)*** (0.024)***
Time Dummies  0.000 0.000 
(p-value)      
Observations  926 926 
R
2  0.78 0.81 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** 5%; * 10% 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
X See text for variable definitions 
 Source: My calculations.    





   Estimate  (S.E.) 
α  4.529 (1.931)*** 
ρo   0.636 (0.220)*** 
ρs  0.444 (0.255)* 
Domestic  0.682 (0.193)*** 
Small  0.727 (0.202)*** 
Medium  0.206 (0.104)** 
Dimension  1.298 (0.582)** 
HP/W  3.829 (2.334)* 
AC  0.016 (0.071) 
Power Windows  -0.149 (0.079)** 
Constant  -19.735 (6.759)*** 
GMM   21.72 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** 5%; * 10% 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 






Average Own Elasticities 
(Sales Weighted) 











1986  -3.82 -3.82  -  -3.19  -4.17  -3.98 
1987  -3.78 -3.78  -  -3.25  -4.99  -3.27 
1988  -4.10 -4.10  -  -3.98  -5.15  -3.19 
1989  -4.63 -4.63  -  -4.59  -4.28  -5.19 
1990  -4.22 -4.22  -  -4.34  -4.17  -4.01 
1991  -5.36 -5.36  -  -4.55  -6.49  -5.28 
1992  -4.15 -4.37  -3.60  -4.28  -4.09  -3.98 
1993  -4.42 -4.56  -4.24  -4.93  -4.19  -3.69 
1994  -4.76 -5.13  -4.20  -5.21  -4.21  -4.37 
1995  -4.44 -4.58  -4.20  -4.53  -4.17  -4.92 
1996  -3.95 -3.88  -4.08  -3.52  -4.95  -3.16 
1997  -3.52 -3.50  -3.54  -3.10  -3.95  -4.83 
1998  -3.27 -3.08  -3.44  -3.35  -3.53  -3.22 
1986-91  -4.32 -4.32  -  -3.99  -4.88  -4.15 
1992-98  -4.07 -4.16  -3.90  -4.13  -4.16  -4.02 
1986-98  -4.19 -4.23  -3.90  -4.06  -4.49  -4.08 
Source: My calculations.  
Table VII 
Average Cross Price Elasticities 
  






























1986  0.0306  0.0306  -  -  -  0.0615 0.0842 0.1335  0.0031 0.0048 0.0026
1987  0.0235  0.0235  -  -  -  0.0699 0.0547 0.0901  0.0016 0.0051 0.0025
1988  0.0311  0.0311  -  -  -  0.0701 0.1244 0.0962  0.0020 0.0053 0.0022
1989  0.0323  0.0323  -  -  -  0.1007 0.0987 0.0991  0.0015 0.0047 0.0022
1990  0.0291  0.0291  -  -  -  0.1181 0.0717 0.0883  0.0012 0.0044 0.0018
1991  0.0352  0.0352  -  -  -  0.1023 0.0919 0.1315  0.0012 0.0047 0.0015
1992  0.0053  0.0197  0.0027  0.0025  0.0038  0.0538 0.0069 0.0097  0.0015 0.0019 0.0009
1993  0.0049  0.0187  0.0031  0.0027  0.0064  0.0501 0.0046 0.0115  0.0014 0.0020 0.0009
1994  0.0041  0.0166  0.0035  0.0025  0.0051  0.0311 0.0051 0.0107  0.0012 0.0021 0.0006
1995  0.0039  0.0152  0.0028  0.0016  0.0070  0.0249 0.0049 0.0098  0.0008 0.0022 0.0008
1996  0.0035  0.0118  0.0027  0.0019  0.0042  0.0189 0.0055 0.0041  0.0004 0.0022 0.0007
1997  0.0030  0.0121  0.0023  0.0014  0.0042  0.0121 0.0041 0.0044  0.0007 0.0021 0.0007
1998  0.0036  0.0125  0.0031  0.0020  0.0050  0.0137 0.0043 0.0224  0.0012 0.0022 0.0005
1986-91  0.0303  0.0303  -  -  -  0.0871 0.0876 0.1064  0.0018 0.0048 0.0021
1992-98  0.0040  0.0152  0.0029  0.0021  0.0051  0.0292 0.0051 0.0104  0.0010 0.0021 0.0007
1986-98  0.0162  0.0222  0.0029  0.0021  0.0051  0.0559 0.0431 0.0547  0.0014 0.0034 0.0014
* The percentage change in the market share of <top group> given a 1% change in the price of <bottom group> 




A Sample from 1987 of Estimated Own and Cross Price Elasticities 


















Sprint  Renault 4 PCM
Renault 21 RX  -1.690  0.148 0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 0.000  0.004  0.002  0.62
Mazda 626 L  0.075  -1.944  0.002 0.002  0.002  0.002 0.000  0.004 0.002  0.55
Chevrolet Monza SLE  0.003  0.002  -2.020  0.106 0.122  0.004  0.042  0.010  0.006  0.53
Renault 9 GTS  0.003  0.002  0.046  -5.141  0.217 0.004  0.325  0.015  0.011 0.21
Mazda 323 NX  0.003  0.002  0.046  0.155  -4.377 0.004 0.338  0.014  0.010  0.24
Mazda 323 HS  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.005  0.005  -2.229 0.002 0.111  0.081  0.47
Chevrolet Chevette  0.004  0.002  0.043  0.152  0.222  0.004  -2.090  0.013 0.008  0.53
Chevrolet Sprint  0.004  0.002  0.002  0.004  0.004  0.024  0.002  -2.753  0.280 0.37
Renault 4  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.023  0.002  0.223  -1.701  0.63
Row i, column j gives the percentage change in the market share of car j given a 1% change in the price of car i.         
Cars are sorted by price, the top car is the most expensive. 
Source: My calculations.                      
 










A Sample from 1992 of Estimated Own and Cross Price Elasticities 



















Mercedes E320  -1.1650  0.0011 0.0009 0.0013  0.0003  0.0004 0.0005  0.0008  0.86
Honda Integra LS Mec  0.0000  -3.5959 0.0013 0.0008  0.0036  0.0004 0.0005  0.0008  0.29
Subaru Legacy  0.0000  0.0014  -2.9107 0.1230 0.0003 0.0004  0.0005 0.0008  0.35
Mazda 626L  0.0000  0.0003  0.0065  -2.6574 0.0009 0.0016  0.0021 0.0033  0.40
Chevrolet Swift 1.6  0.0000  0.0016  0.0002  0.0022  -3.9645  0.0109 0.0188  0.0343  0.26
Mazda 323 HS  0.0000  0.0003  0.0002  0.0023  0.0028  -2.0048  0.0564 0.1167  0.52
Renault 9 Brio  0.0000  0.0003  0.0002  0.0023  0.0026  0.0308  -4.2808  0.4213 0.24
Chevrolet Sprint  0.0000  0.0003  0.0002  0.0021  0.0024  0.0319  0.1409  -3.1550  0.33
Row i, column j gives the percentage change in the market share of car j given a 1% change in the price of car i.       
Cars are sorted by price, the top car is the most expensive. 
















A Sample from 1996 of Estimated Own and Cross Price Elasticities 

































Sprint  PCM 
Mercedes C230  -1.1626  0.0001 0.0266 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004  0.0002  0.0002  0.0008 0.0006 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005  0.8885
Citroen ZX  0.0001  -3.5386 0.0001 0.0055 0.0049 0.0004  0.0077  0.0034  0.0127 0.0086 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005  0.2827
Mazda 626 L  0.0015  0.0000 -2.2248 0.0001 0.0001 0.0011  0.0000  0.0000  0.0002 0.0001 0.0007 0.0015 0.0018  0.4716
VW Golf GL  0.0001  0.0007 0.0001 -2.4602 0.0037 0.0004  0.0111  0.0025  0.0094 0.0064 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005  0.4074
Mitsubishi Lancer  0.0001  0.0003 0.0001 0.0019 -4.6281  0.0091 0.0043  0.0094  0.0451 0.0267 0.0107 0.0246 0.0338 0.2162
Chevrolet Corsa L 5d  0.0000  0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 0.0024  -3.4345  0.0000 0.0026 0.0182 0.0096 0.0341 0.0728 0.0978 0.2978
Daewoo Racer GTI  0.0001  0.0007 0.0001 0.0073 0.0038  0.0004  -3.0199  0.0039 0.0169 0.0105 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005  0.3323
Hyundai Accent LS  0.0001  0.0003 0.0001 0.0019 0.0075  0.0102  0.0040  -2.3948 0.0452 0.0265 0.0139 0.0321 0.0445 0.4181
Skoda Felicia GLX  0.0001  0.0003 0.0001 0.0017 0.0072  0.0136  0.0034  0.0087  -2.0773 0.0260 0.0190 0.0439 0.0610 0.4831
Ford Festiva Hatch  0.0001  0.0003 0.0001 0.0018 0.0073  0.0124  0.0036  0.0089  0.0452 -2.2976 0.0171 0.0395 0.0548 0.4361
Renault 9 Brio  0.0000  0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 0.0025  0.0261  0.0000  0.0030  0.0208 0.0108 -2.1786 0.0760 0.1027 0.4645
Mazda 323 Coupe  0.0000  0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 0.0027  0.0268  0.0000  0.0033  0.0230 0.0119 0.0363 -2.1514 0.1070 0.4696
Chevrolet Sprint  0.0000  0.0000 0.0004 0.0001 0.0028  0.0270  0.0000  0.0034  0.0239 0.0124 0.0367 0.0801 -2.0584  0.4948
Row i, column j gives the percentage change in the market share of car j given a 1% change in the price of car i.                   
Cars are sorted by price, the top car is the most expensive.                                  









   Total Domestic  Foreign  Small  Medium  Large 
1986  8.484 8.484  -  6.924  7.989  11.713 
1987  10.601 10.601  -  7.499 9.526 16.984 
1988  9.587 9.587  -  6.564  6.794  18.210 
1989  7.136 7.136  -  4.952  8.608  9.825 
1990  8.306 8.306  -  5.565  8.555  13.835 
1991  6.445 6.445  -  5.973  5.343  9.268 
1992  8.070 5.741 13.923  4.751  7.756  16.178 
1993  7.276 5.935  8.997  4.229  6.645  16.126 
1994  5.451 4.385  7.025  3.412  6.264  11.892 
1995  5.462 4.259  7.480  3.617  6.075  15.445 
1996  4.974 4.569  5.724  4.312  4.753  16.801 
1997  4.987 4.694  5.307  4.741  4.748  15.086 
1998  5.277 5.173  5.373  4.835  5.045  13.481 
1986-91 8.426 8.426  -  6.246  7.803  13.306 
1992-98 5.928 4.965  7.690  4.271  5.898  15.001 
1986-98 7.081 6.563  7.690  5.183  6.777  14.219 
 
Table XII 
Average Price Cost Margins 
(P-MC)/P*100 
(Sales Weighted) 
   Total Domestic  Foreign  Small  Medium  Large 
1986  32.79 32.79  -  33.48  31.41  34.33 
1987  31.96 31.96  -  33.03  30.52  33.09 
1988  29.44 29.44  -  30.06  20.58  36.51 
1989  24.42 24.42  -  22.43  25.66  24.72 
1990  25.40 25.40  -  22.00  24.57  29.05 
1991  24.76 24.76  -  29.51  21.60  24.95 
1992  35.78 27.55  40.82  26.94  30.33  44.69 
1993  33.01 25.70  35.86  24.93  28.74  41.37 
1994  30.59 23.44  32.44  21.89  29.61  37.03 
1995  32.72 24.39  35.08  25.49  28.89  45.79 
1996  31.35 26.74  33.06  32.86  25.44  43.05 
1997  33.65 29.83  34.76  38.35  28.83  42.66 
1998  34.09 34.77  33.90  40.20  30.81  43.60 
1986-91  28.13 28.13  -  28.42  25.72  30.44 
1992-98  33.03 27.49  35.13  30.09  28.95  42.60 
1986-98  30.77 27.78  35.13  29.32  27.46  36.99 














   Avg. Cost of Domestic Parts  Estimated Marginal Costs 
   Bought by Domestic Firms  Total  Domestic  Foreign 
1986  4,319 16,245  16,245  - 
1987  4,205 16,993  16,993  - 
1988  5,096 16,336  16,336  - 
1989  4,529 16,018  16,018  - 
1990  4,356 15,144  15,144  - 
1991  3,995 14,405  14,405  - 
1992  3,761 13,382  12,472  15,668 
1993  3,089 14,301  13,285  15,604 
1994  3,107 13,879  13,580  14,322 
1995  2,897 12,957  12,575  13,599 
1996  2,711 11,741  11,201  12,742 
1997  2,562 10,925  10,320  11,586 
1998  2,496 9,577  9,036  10,079 
1986-91  4,416 15,857  15,857  - 
1992-98  2,946 12,395  11,781  13,372 
1986-98  3,624 13,993  13,662  13,372 
Source: My calculations. 






1986  4,142 
1987  4,069 
1988  3,763 
1989  2,817 
1990  2,124 
1991  1,746 
1992  2,987 
1993  7,913 
1994  6,901 
1995  6,331 
1996  7,456 
1997  7,551 
1998  5,528 
1986-91  3,110 
1992-98  6,381 
1986-98  4,871 





Welfare improvements due to the existence of foreign cars in the market 
(Observed Welfare minus Counterfactual Welfare) 
(1996 Dollars) 
   Counterfactual with Fix Price  Counterfactual with New Equilibrium Price 
1992  1,270 1,365 
1993  4,298 4,329 
1994  2,287 3,172 
1995  2,453 2,843 
1996  3,354 3,506 
1997  3,966 4,242 
1998  3,371 3,477 
1992-98  3,000 3,276 
Source: My Calculations. 





   PD GEV  PD GEV  PD GEV 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
α  4.529 5.909 4.466 
   (1.931)*** (1.683)*** (1.586)*** 
ρo   0.636 0.667 0.713 
   (0.220)*** (204)*** (0.173)*** 
ρs  0.444 0.427 0.425 
   (0.255)*  (0.234)*  (0.299) 
Domestic  0.682 0.725 0.740 
   (0.193)***  ( 0.200)***  (0.206)*** 
Small  0.727 0.732 0.651 
   (0.202)*** (  0.183)*** (0.206)*** 
Medium  0.206 0.160 0.166 
   (0.104)**  (0.094)*  (0.117) 
Dimension  1.298 1.906     
   (0.582)**  (0.619)***    
HP/W  3.829 5.294 3.679 
   (2.334)* (2.738)**  (2.844) 
AC  0.016   0.02 
   (0.071)  (0.080) 
Pwr Windows  -0.149 -0.123 -0.129 
   (0.079)**  (0.076)  (0.094) 
Constant  -19.735 -24.724 -18.273 
   (6.759)***  ( 5.896)***  (5.081)*** 
GMM  21.72 22.14 27.42 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%    
Robust standard errors in parenthesis    
Source: My calculations.   44
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Source: My Calculations  47
 
Coeffi cient S.E.
Di mensi on -0. 553 (0. 039)***
HP/ W -1. 762 (0. 178)***
AC -0. 039 (0. 006)***
Pwr Wi ndows -0. 021 (0. 008)***
Domest i c 0. 051 (0. 085)
Smal l -0.163 (0.058)**
Medi um -0. 143 (0. 038)***
IV  1 -0.573 (0.253)**
IV  2 -0.430 (0.812)
IV  3 0.003 (0.001)**
IV  4 -2.616 (1.572)*
IV  5 -0.978 (3.862)
IV  6 0.692 (0.204)***
IV  7 -0.138 (0.055)**
IV  8 0. 011 (0. 105)
IV  9 -0. 006 (0. 002)***
IV  1 0 0.111 (0.058)*
IV  1 1 0. 015 (0. 161)
IV  1 2 0. 002 (0. 002)
IV  1 3 0.002 (0.000)***
IV  1 4 0. 001 (0. 001)
IV  1 5 -0. 001 (0. 000)***
IV  1 6 0.002 (0.000)***
IV  1 7 -0. 004 (0. 000)***
F Test  of  excl uded i nstrument s 20. 66
(p-value) 0. 00
Exogenei t y Test 19.996
(p-value) 0. 22
IV 1 =The average di m ensi on for cars shari ng the si ze cl uster 
IV 2 =The average di m ensi on for cars shari ng the ori gi n cl uster.
IV 3 =Te average di mensi on f or cars shari ng bot h si ze and ori gi n cl ust er.
IV 4 = T he  av era g e H P /W  for ca rs sh arin g  th e size clu ster.
IV 5 = T he  av era g e H P /W  for ca rs sh arin g  th e o rigin  cluste r.
IV 6 =The average HP/ W  f or cars shari ng bot h si ze and ori gi n cl ust er.
ÌV 7=The average AC f or cars shari ng the si ze cl ust er.
IV 8 =The average AC f or cars shari ng t he ori gi n cl ust er.
IV 9 =The average AC shari ng both si ze and ori gi n cl uster. 
IV 1 0 =The average of  power wi ndows shari ng t he si ze cl ust er.
IV 1 1 =The average of  power wi ndows shari ng t he ori gi n cl ust er.
IV 1 2 =The average of  power wi ndows shari ng bot h si ze and ori gi n cl ust er.
IV 1 3 = T otal N u m b e r of m o de ls offere d  w ith in the  size  cluste r.
IV 1 4 =Tot al  num ber of  model s of f ered wi t hi n t he ori gi n cl ust er.
IV 1 5 =Real  exchange rat e i ndex
IV 1 6 = T ariffs. F o r d om estic cars it’s the  C K D  ta riff, fo r im p o rted  cars 
         it is the  im p ort tariff
IV 1 7 = S a les tax, 
*** S ignificant at 1%  level; ** 5% ; * 10%
Ti m e dum my vari abl es are al so i ncl uded.  
The F t est  i s t he F t est  of  t he excl uded i nst rum ent s
Tabl e A. 1











   Logit IV  logit 
       
α  1.799 3.024 
   (0.605)*** (1.274)*** 
Domestic  1.322 1.308 
   (0.111)***  (0.111)*** 
Small  1.048 0.896 
   (0.202)*** (0.221)*** 
Medium  0.356 0.228 
   (0.136)***  (0.156) 
Dimension  0.239 1.702 
   (0.810)  (1.206) 
HP/W  -1.536 2.867 
   (3.457) (4.376) 
AC  -0.038 0.032 
   (0.127) (0.133) 
Pwr Windows  -0.208 -0.132 
   (0.136)  (0.1433) 
Constant  -10.956 -13.315 
   (0.914)***  (1.708)*** 
       
*** Significant at 1% level; ** 5%; * 10%    
Source: My Calculations   
 